{"id":147891,"date":"2025-07-15T14:12:59","date_gmt":"2025-07-15T19:12:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.worldtribune.com\/?p=147891"},"modified":"2025-07-15T14:12:59","modified_gmt":"2025-07-15T19:12:59","slug":"analysis-groupthink-blinded-israels-military-in-advance-of-october-7-2023","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/worldtribune.com\/2025\/analysis-groupthink-blinded-israels-military-in-advance-of-october-7-2023\/","title":{"rendered":"Analysis: Groupthink blinded Israel’s military in advance of October 7, 2023"},"content":{"rendered":"

FPI<\/span><\/strong> \/ July 15, 2025<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

By<\/em><\/span> David Isaac<\/span><\/strong><\/a>, Jewish News Syndicate (JNS)<\/a><\/p>\n

The term \u201cconceptzia\u201d (literally \u201cconception\u201d) in Israeli military history refers to the overarching Israeli strategic misconception about Israel\u2019s enemies on the eve of the 1973 Yom Kippur War that they were weak and would not dare to attack Israel. <\/em>\u2014 Aliyah Organization<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

\n

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) performance against Iran throws into sharp relief the difference a conceptzia<\/em> can make.<\/p>\n

The same military that reeled against a Hamas onslaught on Oct. 7, 2023, acted with jaw-dropping efficiency 20 months later.<\/p>\n

\"\"
Israeli F-15I fighter jets headed for a strike in Teheran, June 2025. \/ IDF<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

It was, in large part, due to the way the Israel Defense Forces viewed the threat from Iran vs. that from Gaza.<\/p>\n

Clear-eyed about the dangers from one, it was blinded by misconceptions about the other.<\/p>\n

\u201cWhen your enemies say something, they usually mean what they say. In Iran\u2019s case, we understood that. In Hamas\u2019s case, we did not,\u201d Or Yissachar, director of research at the Israel Defense and Security Forum (IDSF), told JNS.<\/p>\n

The conceptzia<\/em> that misled the IDF about Hamas consisted of a series of governing assumptions:<\/p>\n

1) Hamas had been deterred, particularly after 2021\u2019s \u201cOperation Guardian of the Walls\u201d;<\/p>\n

2) Hamas was contained \u2014 its rockets by the Iron Dome, its invasion tunnels by the \u201cIron Wall,\u201d and<\/p>\n

3) Hamas, preoccupied with governing Gaza, could be bought off.<\/p>\n

\u201cHamas exploited that belief to conduct a years-long deception campaign, not only misleading Israel\u2019s strategic planners but reinforcing the \u2026 conceptzia \u2026, the outdated and unfounded assumptions that Hamas sought calm in exchange for economic relief,\u201d John Spencer, chairman of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point, told JNS.<\/p>\n

Compounding these assumptions was the belief that Hamas wasn\u2019t capable of a major offensive. Israel believed it could mount a small raiding party at most. \u201cIt was a failure of imagination as much as it was a failure of preparation,\u201d Spencer said.<\/p>\n

The IDF, satisfied that Hamas didn\u2019t constitute a real threat, neglected the southern border. \u201cIsrael barely collected intelligence on the group,\u201d IDF Brig. Gen. (res.) Amir Avivi, founder and chairman of the Israel Defense and Security Forum, told JNS.<\/p>\n

Nor was the IDF properly deployed along the border. The security perimeter on the Gaza side gradually shrank as Gazans were permitted to approach the border fence. On the Israeli side, not enough reserve forces were kept in the rear, to be sent where needed in case of attack.<\/p>\n

\u201cYou didn\u2019t have a security perimeter, and all the Israeli forces were deployed along the border. This cannot work. This is not how you defend,\u201d Avivi said. His explanation is that the IDF had become reliant on technology. \u201cTechnology can\u2019t do a thing by itself. It\u2019s one more layer. But it cannot replace how you are supposed to fight.\u201d<\/p>\n

The situation worsened as time went on. Spencer, who visited Israel, said that between 2021 and 2023, \u201ccivilian defensive readiness had relaxed. Firearms restrictions in many kibbutzim had been changed. Thousands of Gazans were permitted to enter southern Israel daily to work in agriculture.\u201d<\/p>\n

By \u201cfirearm restrictions,\u201d Spencer referred to more stringent rules the IDF imposed on community security squads \u2014 rules on preventing weapons theft, rather than ensuring readiness. The rule change required all rifles and ammunition to be locked away in armories. When Hamas attacked on Oct. 7, many couldn\u2019t access their weapons in time. In some cases, the terrorists knew where the armories were and who had the keys.<\/p>\n

A notable exception was at Kibbutz Yad Mordechai, where the head of the security squad ignored the IDF\u2019s orders and kept weapons dispersed to his team. His disobedience saved the kibbutz as the squad repelled the attackers.<\/p>\n

Another example of the general decline in defensive posture was provided by journalist Jonathan Foreman in Commentary in May. He reported that IDF installations near Gaza abandoned the Western military practice of holding a \u201cstand-to\u201d before dawn. A stand-to is when soldiers practice taking up defensive positions in preparation for an enemy attack. It\u2019s not clear when or why they stopped.<\/p>\n

What transpired on Oct. 7 is well known. Hamas managed to surprise and overwhelm the Israeli forces at the border. Israel hadn\u2019t enough reserves to throw them back. It took many hours before the IDF arrived in force. Avivi said that the IDF had always assumed it would take six hours to organize and move forces south. The problem, he said, is that \u201ceverything that happened on the 7th of October happened in the first six hours.\u201d<\/p>\n

The failure makes Israel\u2019s performance against Iran all the more astonishing. Even Israel\u2019s most determined enemies don\u2019t dispute the efficiency of Israel\u2019s military as its Air Force rapidly reduced Iran\u2019s nuclear and ballistic missile facilities over 12 days in June.<\/p>\n

\u201cWhen we put our minds to something, we are capable of doing amazing things. The last IDF chief of staff and General Staff were very focused on Iran and Lebanon. So many things were done well,\u201d Avivi said. \u201cBut at the same time, they completely disregarded the ground forces, Gaza and other issues.\u201d<\/p>\n

Following the Iran attack, Israel\u2019s army revealed it had determined in January 2023 that war with Iran was coming and that it would be a multi-front war. This doesn\u2019t make sense to Avivi. \u201cIf Israel knew it was going to war, why didn\u2019t it beef up its border?\u201d<\/p>\n

Avivi had been warning at that time that the military needed an overhaul. He wasn\u2019t heeded. It\u2019s an issue that goes to the heart of the problem, he says, describing a lecture he attended by the new head of the IDF\u2019s Military Intelligence Directorate, Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder.<\/p>\n

Binder gave an Oct. 7 post-mortem to former generals. \u201cIt sounded like a doctor talking about a patient whose entire system collapsed. I told him: \u2018The one thing you didn\u2019t do was describe the disease.\u2019 And the disease is cultural,\u201d Avivi said.<\/p>\n

That cultural problem, in a word, is groupthink.<\/p>\n

The IDF promotes people who think alike. Prior to Oct. 7, only those focused on cutting-edge technology were promoted, distorting the IDF\u2019s understanding of the problem in Gaza, and leading to a lack of readiness in equipment, munitions and forces, he said.<\/p>\n

\u201cWhen I, and other members of IDSF, talked about the need for more tanks and combat engineers, we were told we were behind the times,\u201d Avivi said.<\/p>\n

If the problem isn\u2019t fixed, Israel will fall prey to another conceptzia in the future. The Oct. 7 attack took place nearly 50 years to the day after the Yom Kippur War, when Israel was almost wiped out because it stuck to another set of false assumptions. Dozens of conferences were held about that earlier conceptzia even as Israel was on the verge of suffering the disastrous impact of another one.<\/p>\n

\u201cThis shows you that if you don\u2019t change culturally, you\u2019ll repeat the same mistake. And the 7th of October was much worse than what happened during the Yom Kippur War,\u201d Avivi said.<\/p>\n

He recommends \u201cmapping\u201d and monitoring cultural changes in the army to ensure the problem is fixed. \u201cIt\u2019s all about the kind of people that you put at the head of the organization. The army must say to itself, \u2018We need diversity of thought.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cPersonnel is policy,\u201d agreed IDSF\u2019s Yissachar, noting that the IDF\u2019s work environment is difficult enough with little financial reward as it is. \u201cAt least make people feel that their ideas are heard. Until now, if you draw outside the lines, the reaction is not positive.\u201d<\/p>\n

Israel\u2019s top brass still don\u2019t like their ideas to be challenged. Officers leading Oct. 7 inquiry teams who were deemed too critical weren\u2019t allowed to present their findings, Yissachar said.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s not a new problem. For example, \u201cred teams\u201d are found in every military and intelligence organization in the world. They exist to contradict prevailing assumptions. \u201cThe CIA, Mi6 and the FBI have serious red teams,\u201d Yissachar said. \u201cThere used to be a red team in the IDF\u2019s Military Intelligence Directorate. It was basically one person, an IDF reservist. He was mostly ignored. Among the intelligence directorate\u2019s upper echelon, alternative interpretations are not warmly welcomed.\u201d<\/p>\n

Also, officers of the General Staff asked to testify before the Knesset have ignored the summons. \u201cImagine if U.S. generals refused to testify before Congress,\u201d Yissachar said. Yet, IDF chiefs of staff have a history of intervening to prevent officers from testifying.<\/p>\n

The previous chief of staff, Lt. Gen. (res.) Herzi Halevi, had this trait in spades, Yissachar said, disliking any criticism, or just people \u201csimply asking questions.\u201d
\nIf there is a silver lining, the IDF and the government now understand that Israel needs to rebuild its army, and on a large scale, especially with the possibility of Egypt and Turkey emerging as future threats, said Avivi.<\/p>\n

But that realization doesn\u2019t necessarily point to the cultural change Avivi and Yissachar speak about.<\/p>\n

Spencer is more forgiving. Although the IDF admittedly suffered a \u201cdevastating failure\u201d on Oct. 7, he gives the military high marks for its subsequent performance in Gaza, saying it has shown \u201cadaptation, resolve and measurable results.\u201d<\/p>\n

Spencer cautions about comparing defensive and offensive operations when looking at the IDF\u2019s performance vs. Iran and on Oct. 7.<\/p>\n

\u201cMilitaries around the world are generally more comfortable preparing for offensive operations than building comprehensive national defense,\u201d he said, noting that defense requires political consensus, prioritizing threats and ongoing investment.<\/p>\n

\u201cIn Israel\u2019s case, that meant prioritizing Iran and Hezbollah, and underestimating Hamas. That was not just an intelligence failure, it was a systemic vulnerability common to many democratic societies,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n

David Isaac is Senior Israel Correspondent of Jewish News Syndicate (JNS)<\/a><\/span>. He serves on the Advisory Board of the<\/em> Free Press Foundation<\/a><\/span><\/strong>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

FPI \/ July 15, 2025 By David Isaac, Jewish News Syndicate (JNS) The term \u201cconceptzia\u201d (literally \u201cconception\u201d) in Israeli military history refers to the overarching Israeli strategic misconception about Israel\u2019s enemies on the eve of the 1973 Yom Kippur War that they were weak and would not dare to attack Israel. \u2014 Aliyah Organization The […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":147908,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,146,147,41,148,9,10,44],"tags":[144,145,6],"class_list":["post-147891","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-exclusives","category-guest-columnists","category-hamas","category-iran","category-israel","category-rest-of-the-best","category-top-stories","category-world-news","tag-144","tag-analysis-groupthink-blinded-israels-military-in-advance-of-october-7","tag-worldtribune-com","last_archivepost"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/worldtribune.com\/2025\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/147891","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/worldtribune.com\/2025\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/worldtribune.com\/2025\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worldtribune.com\/2025\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/6"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worldtribune.com\/2025\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=147891"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/worldtribune.com\/2025\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/147891\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worldtribune.com\/2025\/wp-json\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/worldtribune.com\/2025\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=147891"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worldtribune.com\/2025\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=147891"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worldtribune.com\/2025\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=147891"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}