War-torn Afghanistan holds the dubious distinction of being the world’s largest opium producer; narcotics in turn fund the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban forces as well as many local war lords. Opium, which goes into global heroin market, comes from vast fields of poppy cultivation.

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) asserts that there’s a twenty-two percent drop in cultivation and that 20 of the land-locked country’s 34 provinces are now “poppy free.” Importantly 800,000 fewer farmers are involved in poppy cultivation than just a year earlier, according to the 2009 Afghan Opium Survey.

While the report credits a tougher anti-narcotics program by both Afghan and multi-national military forces, the document adds that declining world prices and falling demand for heroin could be playing a part in the drop. Significantly 10,000 tons of opium, a two year supply on the global market, are secretly stashed away in the countryside.

UNODC Director Antonio Maria Costa, stressed, “Controlling drugs in Afghanistan will not solve all of the country’s problems, but the country’s problems can not be solved without controlling drugs.” He cautioned that it “is too early to tell if the decrease in opium cultivation and production over the past two years is a market correction that could be reversed, or a downward trend.”

In the wider picture, U.S. force commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal offered a sobering statement on the military situation; the situation is “serious” but “success is achievable.” This is most certainly correct, but begs the question; what next? There are over 100,000 multinational military forces in Afghanistan, the majority American. The Obama Administration is sending additional troops in a bid to battle both Al-Qaida terrorists and the Taliban insurgency. Still this strategy emerges as a very open-ended military commitment. Afghanistan has become Obama’s war.

In a country as geographically large and inaccessible as Afghanistan, more troops are certainly warranted, but to what end? Lifting Afghanistan from the poverty and chaos caused by the Soviet invasion and occupation after 1979, building a working civil society, and ensuring a reasonably effective and democratic government are laudable goals but are challenged by corruption and the Taliban terrorists who spread intimidation and fear throughout the beleaguered land of 33 million people.

The concept of Nation-building becomes a contradiction when viewed in the context of Afghanistan’s ethnic quilt of tribal-warlords, fiefdoms and militias. Add the chimera of President Hamid Karzai’s corrupt and ineffective “central government” in Kabul, the challenged credibility of the recent presidential election, and you are almost working at cross purposes for the brave blood and sacrifice shed by American, British and Canadian forces among others.

Development aid and assistance, liberally provided by the USA, the Europeans and Japan moreover will only take root if there is more than a minimum of security in the society. Yet Afghans are historically suspicious of foreign forces, even those bearing gifts. In a deeply traditional Islamic society, goodwill from NATO or nearly anyone else is suspect.

So what should we do? NATO needs more troops, boots on the ground. Why not task Turkey, a Muslim member of the alliance with a huge land army to contribute more? Early on in the mission, soon after the toppling of the Taliban regime in 2001 after the terrorist atrocities of September 11th , I recall a Turkish force commander in Kabul. Perhaps a New Strategy would be working with Turkey’s tough military to deal with the Taliban while the U.S. concentrates on the stepped-up training of Afghan military and police.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated recently that his country’s forces will double to 1,600 troops from 800 when in November, Turkey assumes control of NATO operations in the Afghan capital Kabul. This is a welcome and necessary step but can and should be enhanced by a larger and very needed pledge by Ankara to deploy perhaps two combat brigades. With mountain experience and ethnic ties to parts of the country, the Muslim but secular Turks would offer a serious and needed troop commitment, as well as a wider Islamic cultural imprint on the mission.

Stability in Afghanistan needs some creative thinking and commitment to a broader counter-insurgency strategy. As Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chief of Staff stated, “Time is not on our side.” It most certainly isn’t.